# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

TIMOTHY GERALD MILLIGAN,	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	
<b>v.</b>	§	Civil Action No. 4:07-CV-251-Y
	§	
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director,	§	
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,	§	
<b>Correctional Institutions Division,</b>	§	
Respondent.	§	

# FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

# I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

## A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a person in state custody.

## B. PARTIES

Petitioner Timothy Gerald Milligan, TDCJ #462350, is a state prisoner in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, in Colorado City, Texas.

Respondent Nathaniel Quarterman is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ).

# C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Milligan is in custody of the TDCJ pursuant to two 1987 convictions in Case No. 0288419D in the 213<sup>th</sup> Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. Milligan was released to mandatory supervision in May 1989, but his release was revoked in February 2007. (Resp't Motion to Dismiss, Exhibits B & C.) Milligan filed this federal petition on April 200, 2007. Quarterman has filed a motion to dismiss the petition on exhaustion grounds. Milligan has not timely replied to the motion.

#### D. ISSUES

Milligan appears to complain of lost street time credits and lack of due diligence by the state to locate and arrest him. (Resp't Answer at 2.) *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)-(2).

#### E. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES IN STATE COURT

Applicant's seeking habeas corpus relief under § 2254 are required to exhaust all claims in state court before requesting federal collateral relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c)<sup>2</sup>; *Fisher v. Texas*,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>A pro se habeas petition is filed when the petition is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. *Spotville v. Cain*, 149 F.3d 374 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) provide in pertinent part as follows:

<sup>(</sup>b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that —

<sup>(</sup>A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

<sup>(</sup>B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

<sup>(</sup>ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

<sup>(</sup>c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

169 F.3d 295, 302 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of the federal habeas claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-45 (1999); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). This requires that the state court be given a fair opportunity to pass on the claim, which in turn requires that the applicant present his claim in a procedurally proper manner according to the rules of the state courts. Depuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988). Under the circumstances of this case, Milligan may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by presenting both the factual and legal basis for his claim in a state habeas application pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2005); Alexander v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 906, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1998); Bautista v. McCotter, 793 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986); Richardson, 762 F.2d at 432. See also Ex Parte Bates, 978 S.W.2d 575, 576-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Moreover, before seeking relief under article 11.07, Texas inmates are generally required to first pursue time-credit complaints through a dispute resolution process within the prison system. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.0081 (Vernon 2004).<sup>3</sup> Only after such administrative relief is pursued and the inmate receives a written

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Section 501.0081 of the Texas Government Code provides:

<sup>(</sup>a) The department shall develop a system that allows resolution of a complaint by an inmate who alleges that time credited on the inmate's sentence is in error and does not accurately reflect the amount of time-served credit to which the inmate is entitled.

<sup>(</sup>b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), an inmate may not in an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07, Code of Criminal Procedure, raise as a claim a time-served credit error until:

<sup>(1)</sup> the inmate receives a written decision issued by the highest authority provided for in the resolution system; or

<sup>(2)</sup> if the inmate has not received a written decision described by Subdivision (1), the 180<sup>th</sup> day after the date on which under the resolution system the inmate first alleges time(continued...)

decision issued by the highest authority provided for in the resolution system, or if 180 days have passed without receipt of such a written decision, may the inmate then file a state application for writ of habeas corpus. *See id.* 501.0081(b)(1)-(2); *Ex Parte Stokes*, 15 S.W.3d 532, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Milligan has not availed himself of the administrative review process set forth in § 501.0081 or sought habeas relief in state court. Absent a showing that state remedies are inadequate, such showing not having been demonstrated by Milligan, he cannot now proceed in this court in habeas corpus. *See* 28 U.S.C. §2254; *Fuller v. Florida*, 473 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1973); *Frazier v. Jones*, 466 F.2d 505, 506 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1972). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, Milligan must first pursue his claims, both, through the administrative process, if necessary, and by way of state application for writ of habeas corpus. Only after his state remedies are concluded may he raise his complaint in this court by way of a federal petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. *Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).<sup>4</sup> Absent a showing that state remedies are inadequate, such showing not having been demonstrated by Milligan, he cannot now proceed in this court in habeas corpus. *See* 28 U.S.C. §2254; *Fuller v. Florida*, 473 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1973); *Frazier v. Jones*, 466 F.2d 505, 506 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>(...continued) served credit error.

<sup>(</sup>c) Subsection (b) does not apply to an inmate who, according to the department's computations, is within 180 days of the inmate's presumptive parole date, date of release on mandatory supervision, or date of discharge. An inmate described by this subsection may raise a claim of time-served credit error by filing a complaint under the system described by Subsection (a) or, if an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not otherwise barred, by raising the claim in that application.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>It is noted that the District Court may, in its discretion, deny relief on the instant federal petition notwithstanding the failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Accordingly, dismissal of this federal habeas corpus proceeding for lack of exhaustion is warranted so that Milligan can fully exhaust his state remedies and then return to this court, if he so desires, after exhaustion has been properly and fully accomplished.

## II. RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore recommended that Quarterman's motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that Milligan's petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice, except as to any application of the federal statute of limitations or other federal procedural bar that may apply.

# III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until October 1, 2007. The United States District Judge need only make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); *Carter v. Collins*, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990).

IV. ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until October 1, 2007, to

serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the

opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing

date of the objections.

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to

the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby

is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.

SIGNED September 10, 2007.

/s/ Charles Bleil

CHARLES BLEIL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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